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CIVIL PLAINTIFFS TO RECOVER
INTRODUCTION
I. THE HURDLES THAT STEALTHING PLAINTIFFS MUST JUMP
THROUGH IN OBTAINING RECOGNITION OF A NEW CAUSE OF
ACTION
A. Factors Related to General Recognition of a New Tort
1. Normative Weight
2. Justiciability
3. “Critical Mass” Caseload
4. Novelty
B. Hurdles Specific to Recognition of Novel Causes of Action
Related to Sexual Misconduct
1. Gender Biases
2. Constitutional Right to Privacy
II. THE TORT OF BATTERY PROVIDES THE BEST FRAMEWORK FOR
PLAINTIFFS
A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
C. Battery
1. Intent
2. Harmful or Offensive Contact
3. Consent
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
A pervasive trend invading the sexual interactions between men
and women, and homosexual men, is “stealthing” or “nonconsensual
condom removal.”1 Stealthing garnered national and legal attention
following Alexandra Brodsky’s article and study concerning the prac-
tice published in 2017.2 A typical stealthing case involves an initial,
1. See Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape-Adjacent”: Imagining Legal Responses to Nonconsen-
sual Condom Removal, 32COLUM.J.GENDER &L.183,188–89 (2017). Alexandra Brodsky,
a Yale law student at the time of conducting her study and current Kazan Budd Staff
Attorney at Public Justice, investigated the issue of nonconsensual condom removal and
analyzed potential legal remedies for the conduct.
2. Nara Schoenberg, Bringing ‘Stealthing’—Nonconsensual Condom Removal—Out
of the Shadows, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:46 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com
/lifestyles/sc-stealthing-condom-removal-family-0427-20170427-story.html [https://perma
.cc/5MAG-33XM].
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consensual sexual relationship between two parties predicated on
the use of contraception.3 During the act, the partner removes the
condom without the knowledge or consent of their sexual partner.4
Brodsky’s research uncovered internet forums and subsets of men
who believe that stealthing is rooted in male superiority and a right
to “spread his seed.”5 Due to a lack of reporting or understanding
about the nature of the conduct, the exact number of victims is un-
known but reports suggest that as many as one-third of women and
one-fifth of men have been stealthed.6 While victims are uncertain
about how to describe what happened to them in a legal sense, the
feelings of violation and the increased risks are comparable to rape.7
It is difficult to make sense of the disturbing practice and its
motivations; however, perpetrators of the assault are widespread and
notorious in their encouragement of stealthing.8 Supporters have
gone so far as to create named social organizations online, such as
the Bareback Brotherhood, and purchase bracelets or indicate the
organization in their Twitter bios as a badge of pride to other mem-
bers.9 In a realm where protection from sexually transmitted disease
is almost entirely in the hands of the male partner, the phenomenon
should be of particular concern as it constitutes a complete disregard
for the victim’s health.10
Despite its widespread impact, there has yet to be a criminal or
civil case concerning nonconsensual condom removal brought in the
United States, and the legislature has not proactively criminalized
3. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 184 n.6. For the purposes of this Note, “predicated
on the use of contraception” includes both when it is explicitly conditioned or when it is
initially used but removed without the knowledge of the other. The rationale behind not
distinguishing lies in the implicit belief that a condom will remain used when initially
put on and the reliance that it will not be removed.
4. Id. at 184.
5. Id. at 188–89.
6. Melissa Cunningham, One in Three Women Victim to ‘Stealth’ Condom Removal,
THE AGE (June 3, 2019, 4:46 PM), https://www.theage.com.au/national/victoria/one-in
-three-women-victim-to-stealth-condom-removal-20190603-p51ty5.html [https://perma.cc
/5B94-HQHS].
7. Brodsky, supra note 1, at 184.
8. Id.
9. George Forgan-Smith, Consent, Choice, & Bareback Sex, THE HEALTHY BEAR
(June 7, 2012), https://thehealthybear.com/consent-choice-bareback-sex [https://perma.cc
/5E4R-UZ2R].
10. See Jenny A. Higgins, Susie Hoffman & Shari L. Dworkin, Rethinking Gender,
Heterosexual Men, and Women’s Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, 100AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 435,
436 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2820057/pdf/435.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/G8WD-2RUS] (“Feminist researchers also argued repeatedly and convincingly that
gender inequality places women in unequal power positions that make pressing for condom
use difficult, if not impossible, with these gendered power dynamics also increasing
vulnerability to HIV . . . . by leading them to place a premium on love and romantic
relationships.”).
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the conduct.11 The motives of the perpetrator as well as the harm
suffered by the victims provide a compelling basis for a legal remedy,
but it is difficult to predict how courts will respond when confronted
with a stealthing case.12 Brodsky focused her legal analysis on the
various routes that court systems may take and ultimately advo-
cated for the creation of a new tort to address the trend.13 She bases
this on legitimate concerns about bias that she fears will be exacer-
bated by existing legal doctrine.14
There are several advantages associated with creating a new
tort to specifically address stealthing as opposed to incorporating
the conduct under an existing form of liability. First, if the new tort
is sufficiently outlined and delineated, it would likely leave less
room for debate in courts over which cases apply and which do not,
given that the legal requirements will be specifically catered to the
issue.15 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, are the societal re-
form benefits from specifically recognizing the trend as warranting
liability.16 Often, the law changes to conform with changing social
norms,17 but it can also operate in the reverse18: recognizing and
codifying stealth laws sends a clear message to society that such an
act is wrong and offenders will be punished.19 Further, it sends a clear
message to victims that they have a cognizable claim.20 In Brodsky’s
research, she discovered that many women did not understand the
nature of what happened to them or how to describe it.21 If courts or
legislators establish that stealthing is sexual misconduct and a
11. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 184 n.4; see, e.g., Sofia Lotto Persio, What is
Stealthing and Why Do Lawmakers in California and Wisconsin Want it Classified as
Rape?, NEWSWEEK(May 17, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/what-stealthing
-lawmakers-california-and-wisconsin-want-answer-be-rape-610986 [https://perma.cc/E2SX
-FL9V].
12. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 208–10 (discussing various possible legal remedies
for stealthing victims, but as there is no existing case law, we cannot be certain what
potential avenue will prove successful). This Note will ultimately advocate that the tort
of battery is the most viable claim for stealthing victims.
13. Id.
14. See Michael Nedelman, Some Call It ‘Stealthing’, Others Call It Sexual Assault,
CNN (Apr. 28, 2017, 3:11 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/27/health/stealthing-sexual
-assault-condoms/index.html [https://perma.cc/FQE8-W92X].
15. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 208–09.
16. See id. at 208.
17. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, Torts Without Names, New
Torts, and the Future of Liability for Intangible Harm, 68AM.UNIV.L.REV. 2089, 2096–97
(discussing how strict liability arose out of the changing attitude of the general public
that a manufacturer profiting from the sale of products should also be responsible for in-
juries caused by said products).
18. See Nedelman, supra note 14.
19. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 208.
20. See id. at 209.
21. Id. at 183–84.
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violation worthy of a specific remedy, it informs victims and perpe-
trators alike of the illegality of the conduct. In this way, an official
recognition of stealthing could serve as an instrument of social change
as opposed to a byproduct of it.
While a unique problem may deserve a unique remedy, the cre-
ation of a new tort to address stealthing will add additional hurdles to
an already uphill battle.22 At the expense of viable claims, victims
of stealthing will already be forced to combat gender biases, judicial
notions of sexual privacy, and a lack of established precedent as they
seek relief for their client.23 By pursuing recognition of a novel cause
of action, stealthing victims will additionally have to wrangle with an
extraordinary judicial reluctance to expand the law beyond its cur-
rent parameters.24
In arguing a case of first impression, the advocate is taking the
lead and attempting to convince a judge that the injury their client
has suffered requires recognition.25 The strategic choices and argu-
ments that a litigator makes will determine whether the claim moves
forward or is dismissed. While there is a natural desire to recognize
a legal wrong and violation by pinpointing the conduct and unequiv-
ocally stating this is wrong, this desire should be second to a far
more pressing motivation—providing victims with the best route for
compensation.26 The primary goal for advocates of stealthing victims
should be to obtain a legal remedy for their client with a secondary,
long-term goal of gaining widespread recognition of the violation as
being deserving of a specific cause of action.
Though Brodsky’s pursuit of a new cause of action to address
stealthing is admirable, it ignores the nature of the dance between
an advocate and the judiciary. When two dancers take the floor, the
leader is responsible for insuring that their partner glides along
with them—a task made easier when their partner knows the steps,
the song, the direction. It is not as simple as taking your partner and
forcing them into your movements as any hesitancy in their steps
will cause both of you to stumble. In the same vein, stealthing ad-
vocates should rely on the existing law to obtain relief on behalf of
their client and prevent the judiciary from moving on their own,
binding the courts by their own precedent.
This Note will suggest that the best way to insure both the short-
term and long-term goals is not through the creation of a new tort
22. See infra Section I.B.
23. See infra Section I.B.
24. See Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2101–02 n.43.
25. See id. at 2095.
26. See Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV.
1539, 1563–65 (1997).
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to address stealthing, but by using the existing precedent of battery
as the legal basis for stealthing claims.27 In Part I, this Note will dis-
cuss the prerequisites for recognition of any new tort as well as the
specific hurdles that sexual misconduct claimants will face. Part II
will then discuss the existing legal options available to stealthing
claimants and ultimately argue that battery is the best cause of ac-
tion for stealthing claimants to bring their claims under.
I. THE HURDLES THAT STEALTHING PLAINTIFFS MUST JUMP
THROUGH IN OBTAINING RECOGNITION OF A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION
“[W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit
or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.”28 While Blackstone’s
mantra should provide a strong argument for the recognition of new
causes of action as new legal wrongs reveal themselves, in reality,
courts are not receptive to the creation of new torts.29 Judges and
scholars alike are antagonistic to new causes of action or imposing
new forms of liability, believing that tort law should not be devel-
oped by looking forward to social change, but backward through the
development of case law.30 Prosser, a principal developer of tort law,
decried “bleeding heart” attempts to “empower[] the disenfranchised”
or shift power through tort law.31 This belief mirrors the conservative
approach courts have taken to the creation of new causes of action;
courts typically reserve social change for the legislature, whereas
their job is to remedy injuries already protected by existing law.32
As a result, a new, named tort has not been created in “nearly
a century” and claims that have found a place within tort law did so
as a result of major, societal and political shifts.33 For example, the
realm of products liability developed as a result of the monumental
evolution of the manufacturing and distribution process, particu-
larly in the manufacturing of automobiles.34 Strict liability and
27. But see Brodsky, supra note 1, at 201. Brodsky argues that the biases affecting
a judge’s sympathy to stealthing victims may also inhibit their recognition of the dignitary
harm necessary to a battery claim, which, in her eyes, makes a new tort the more viable
option. Id. However, this Note will suggest that these same biases impact new causes of
action more harshly than they would impact a battery claimant.
28. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (quoting Sir William Blackstone,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, VOL. 3: OF PRIVATE WRONGS).
29. See Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2091–92.
30. Bernstein, supra note 26, at 1552.
31. Id. at 1553.
32. See James C. Stuchell, Tradition, Distortion, and Creation: Three Approaches to
“Battered Woman’s Syndrome” In Tort, 8 REGENT U. L. REV. 83, 114–15 (1997).
33. Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2091–93.
34. See Francis J. O’Brien, The History of Products Liability, 62 TUL.L.REV. 313, 314
(1988).
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negligence evolved to meet the demands of a new world where high-
way accidents were extremely common and it became clear that the
country was shifting to an increasingly mobile world, requiring the
courts to provide redress for unwitting consumers who were in a poor
position to protect themselves.35 Similarly, as the stigma around
mental distress dissolved and diagnosing mental illness became
more common, the law supplied a remedy for intangible harm that
had been previously avoided.36 The courts erected the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress to address the gap and new
acceptance of pure emotional harm.37
In the age of the #MeToo movement and sexual freedom, sexual
misconduct and its legality is being debated with vigor.38 Whereas in
generations prior, sexual harassment in the workplace was ignored
or accepted as a necessary evil to human interaction, present-day
victims have a stronger voice than ever to litigate their claims.39
Following Brodsky’s article, stealthing itself has found a place in the
national conversation as the United States debates sexual miscon-
duct and how to prevent its continued permeation into our society.40
If intentional infliction of emotional distress found a doorway into
courtrooms through a better understanding of emotional harm, the
door for litigants of novel forms of sexual misconduct has been
thrown open by the current generation’s passion for reform in the
area.41 However, social salience and desire alone are not enough to
achieve judicial recognition of a new tort; a new cause of action must
present several additional factors before implementation can even
be possible.42
35. See id. at 317–18.
36. See Stuchell, supra note 32, at 112 (discussing the development of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotion distress).
37. Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2095–96.
38. See Alia E. Dastagir, It’s Been Two Years Since the #MeToo Movement Exploded.
Now What?, USATODAY (Oct. 28, 2019, 3:58 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation/2019/09/30/me-too-movement-women-sexual-assault-harvey-weinstein-brett
-kavanaugh/1966463001 [https://perma.cc/5KK7-FMNP].
39. See Jane E. Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature
‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 443 (1993).
40. See Persio, supra note 11.
41. Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2096. The current discussion about sexual
misconduct and its adverse impact on women’s social and professional standing is com-
parable to the societal shift that preceded recognition of the action of intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 2095.
42. See id. at 2097–106. Abraham and White establish a framework for analyzing
potential new torts and outline several requirements that should be met before a cause
of action warrants recognition as a new tort. Id. at 2094–95. These requirements are
social salience, normative weight, justiciability, essentiality, and practicality. Id. at 2090.
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A. Factors Related to General Recognition of a New Tort
There are several factors critical to the recognition of any new
cause of action. First, it is in the interest of both society and the equal
administration of justice that potential defendants be aware of the
per se wrongness of their conduct.43 Thus, a new cause of action should
be something that society already acknowledges as wrong, whether
it be evolving changes in societal notions or a general recognition that
the conduct is inappropriate.44 Second, a new cause of action must
be justiciable and provide concrete standards for a court to apply.45
Third, there should be enough cases arising under the cause of action
to provide a framework for the courts to use moving forward.46 Lastly,
the creation of a new tort is only warranted when the conduct is not
addressed by law or through an existing tort.47
1. Normative Weight
While the current social climate surrounding sexual misconduct
may already be enough to satisfy the factor of social salience evident
in the realization of new torts, the general conduct associated with
stealthing further establishes significant normative weight.48 A crit-
ical aspect of our civil and criminal law systems is that potential
defendants are on notice about the potential liability of their conduct.49
For this reason, we impose standards like extreme or outrageousness
in the context of intentional infliction of emotional distress to pre-
vent imposing liability against people who were unaware of the
inappropriateness of their conduct.50
43. See id. at 2095. The crux of the argument proposed by Abraham & White is en-
suring that new causes of action are created because they are already recognized as legal
wrongs in society. Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2091–93. Though not explicitly
stated, there is an implication that this is to protect undeserving and unintentionally
wrongful conduct from liability. Id. at 2095. Societal or normative knowledge of the
wrongfulness of a particular conduct puts a potential defendant on notice that what he
is doing is wrong and may put him at risk of liability. Id.
44. Id. at 2095–98.
45. Id. at 2100.
46. Id. at 2104.
47. Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2099, 2103.
48. The United States has long established that there is an individual right to bodily
autonomy and the right to refuse touching; it is difficult to argue that a defendant doesn’t
understand that their behavior is inappropriate when they act in opposition to the ex-
press conditions of their sexual partner. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
49. See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 330 (2003).
50. See Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2097. It would be difficult to argue that
conduct a judge or jury finds to be extreme or outrageous would not be sufficiently out-
rageous to put the defendant on notice that they are violating a right.
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At its core, stealthing is a violation of bodily autonomy.51 The
United States has long established that there is an individual right
to bodily autonomy and the right to refuse certain contact.52 A per-
son’s autonomy in refusing contact is uncontroverted and extends
from even the most extreme nonconsensual contact, like rape, to the
most minimal.53 A violation of bodily autonomy is exacerbated in
stealthing cases because the contact involves sexual intercourse,
which potentially exposes the victim to life-altering sexually trans-
mitted diseases and pregnancy.54 Further, a material misrepresen-
tation comparable with removing the condom after promising or
implying its use constitutes an actionable claim in other contexts.55
The intentional intrusion of bodily autonomy as well as the deliber-
ate deception required of stealthing perpetrators is enough to put a
defendant on notice of the per se wrongness of their conduct; just as
they know they should not smack someone, or lie to them, they know
they should not stealth someone.56
51. Infra Conclusion; see also Brodsky, supra note 1, at 186.
52. Infra Conclusion; see also Brodsky, supra note 1, at 186.
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18.
54. See Olivia Nankinga, Cyprian Misinde, & Betty Kwagala, Gender Relations, Sexual
Behavior, and Risk of Contracting Sexually Transmitted Infections Among Women in Union
in Uganda, BMC PUB. HEALTH at 2 (2016), https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com
/track/pdf/10.1186/s12889-016-3103-0. In addition to a biological predisposition to an
increased likelihood of contracting an STI, traditional gender roles significantly inhibit
a woman’s ability to negotiate within sexual relationships. Id. at 6.
55. See 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 27 (2013) (The elements for fraudulent mis-
representation require “that the defendant ma[k]e a false representation of a material
fact with knowledge of its falsity”) (emphasis added). Courts have recognized a material
misrepresentation in the sale of a house where the soil condition was unable to sustain
vegetation or a defect in a car before trading it in. See Griffith v. Byers Const. Co., 510
P.2d 198, 205 (Kan. 1973). One could argue that the removal of a condom against the
consent of another clearly constitutes a material misrepresentation, assuming that the
victim would not have consented to sex if they had known the intent to use a condom was
fabricated; however, courts have ignored the materiality of such misrepresentations in
other sexual interactions. See, e.g., Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620–21 (Cal.
App. 1980). It is difficult to reconcile the law’s recognition of the impact of fraudulent mis-
representations as it pertains to business transactions involving purely pecuniary losses
with its ignorance of the crime’s impact in sexual relationships, absent physical harm.
Compare Griffith v. Byers Const. Co., 510 P.2d 198, 205 (Kan. 1973) and Lindberg
Cadillac Co. v. Aron, 371 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963) with Stephen K. v. Roni L.,
164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620–21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); see also Larson, supra note 39, at 412 (“To
put it plainly, a man may do things to get a woman’s agreement to sex that would be
illegal were he to take her money in the same way.”).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 cmt. h. Both the physical intrusion and
the deception implicated in stealthing claims are addressed in the torts of fraudulent
misrepresentation and battery. By separating the two areas of conduct from one another,
a defendant should know that both behaviors are inappropriate and could expose him
to potential liability. It would be difficult to argue that a defendant did not understand
it was wrong to punch a victim or lie to them about a material defect in a home, just as it
would be difficult to maintain that they were unaware that it was wrong to remove con-
traception against the consent of their sexual partner.
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2. Justiciability
A new cause of action must provide the court with discrete, con-
crete, and contained standards for application; otherwise, stealthing
victims will be vulnerable to dismissal under 12(b)(6), the first line
of defense for perpetrators.57 Courts will ask, where does the tort
begin and where does the tort end?58 Litigants who fail to answer
this question and leave questions for the determination of the court
will be subject to dismissal, a death knell to victims of novel causes
of action.59
Advocates for stealthing victims will have difficulty articulating
the standards of the proposed tort.60 Victims of stealthing have suf-
fered violations of both their interest in bodily autonomy and freedom
from misrepresentation, and balancing these two interests could lead
to confusion in the courts.61 In presenting the cause of action, should
the plaintiff focus on the physical violation or the deception? The
former could lead courts to focus primarily on the physical harm in-
stead of allowing room for the intangible harm that arises from the
violation itself. However, if the focus is instead placed on the decep-
tion involved, it could be extended beyond the bounds of stealthing.62
For example, a court could extend liability for failing to reveal mari-
tal status, gender identity, race, or religion.63 The proper balance to
strike is one that accounts for the intangible harm associated with the
violation of the victim’s consent, while also avoiding overregulation
of sexual relationships.64 This may prove difficult to convey to a court
57. Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2100; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to limit
the potential for claims that would generate questions of boundaries and formation, con-
crete standards for the proposed conduct must be suggested.
58. See Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2100.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 2140.
61. See, e.g., Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2101 (comparing two proposed torts—
suppression of protected speech and spoilation of evidence—and highlighting the value
of more definitive language).
62. Brodsky, supra note 1, at 194–95.
63. See Kim Shayo Buchanan, When Is HIV a Crime? Sexuality, Gender and Consent,
99 MINN.L.REV. 1231, 1277–78 (2015); Florence Ashley, Genderfucking Non-Disclosure:
Sexual Fraud, Transgender Bodies, and Messy Identities, 41 DALHOUSIE L.J. 339, 343
(2018); Athena Katsampes, A Rape by Any Other Name? The Problem of Defining Acts
of Protection Deception and the University as a Solution, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 157,
165 (2017). Courts have repeatedly declined to recognize the tort of sexual fraud, but
when they have recognized sexual battery through deception, it has been imposed in-
equitably against minority groups. Buchanan, supra note 63, at 1342. Particularly, it has
resulted in criminalization of failing to disclose HIV status even when there is no risk
of exposure, against transgender individuals for failing to disclose their gender status, and
religious minorities. Id. at 1306–07.
64. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 193.
940 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:931
in a matter of first impression and leaving questions about what the
tort encompasses may lead to extremely rigid standards that would
limit its availability to future plaintiffs.65
Outside of contextualization, there are also significant evidentiary
hurdles associated with stealthing.66 Inherently, stealthing claims
will almost always lack witnesses and outside of cases with physical
harm (STD transmission or pregnancy), there may be no evidence at
all, aside from the word of the victim and the defendant.67 A lack of
evidence outside of testimony by the parties and difficulty defining
the tort will not inspire the judiciary to override the separation of
powers and rule on a matter without existing precedent.68
3. “Critical Mass” Caseload
Tangential to the requirement that a new cause of action arise
only out of a need and not out of a desire for social change, a new
cause of action should present a legal issue likely to result in a large
caseload.69 Through the common law system and the use of prece-
dent in developing our legal rules, a significant case load is neces-
sary to fully develop a tort and insure its consistent application.70 A
judge is going to be unwilling to rule in favor of a novel cause of action
that appears to be a one-off instance of conduct as opposed to yield-
ing the necessary caseload to develop the tort.71 In order to provide
a viable avenue for future victims, representation has to be not only
possible, but also inexpensive.72 A plaintiff’s attorney will likely take
a stealthing case under a contingent-fee basis and concerns about the
expense of litigating a novel claim could either prevent them from
advocating for the victim entirely or charging a premium.73
Contributing to confusion about what stealthing actually is and
whether it constitutes a violation is the fact that there has not been
65. Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2100–01.
66. See Larson, supra note 39, at 451.
67. Larson states:
Because sexual interaction typically occurs in private, and rarely yields
direct corroborative evidence . . . it is often difficult to adjudicate charges of
sexual wrongdoing . . . . Often, the result is what has come to be known as
a ‘swearing contest’—a credibility battle pitting the unsupported testimony
of the complainant against that of the defendant.
See Larson, supra note 39, at 451.
68. See id. at 441.
69. Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2104.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 2105.
72. Id. at 2105–06.
73. Id.
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a single civil or criminal case brought in the United States address-
ing either question.74 However, reports and cases outside the United
States and the conclusions of Brodsky’s study suggest that the
problem is pervasive enough to warrant a cause of action.75 As
knowledge of stealthing and its implications expands, it is foresee-
able that a significant number of claims could be brought in order to
prompt judicial recognition and attorney representation.76
4. Novelty
Despite attempts by female legislators to introduce legislation
criminalizing stealthing, none have been successful.77 This lack of leg-
islative recognition could encourage judicial action, but if the con-
duct at issue is already conceivably addressed by a pre-existing tort,
courts may be unwilling to expand liability.78 The courts’ primary func-
tion is to enforce the law, not to create it, and the judiciary sidesteps
this by recognizing a new cause of action only when there is an obvi-
ous need.79 If conduct is already addressed through statutory means
or through an existing cause of action, courts will not intervene.80
Many forms of sexual misconduct are found in elements of other
causes of action.81 Sexual harassment cases can make arguments
under the existing framework of assault, sexual deception cases
under fraud, and battered women’s syndrome finds its place within
a combination of existing torts.82 Stealthing, likewise, implicates
74. Brodsky, supra note 1, at 184 n.4.
75. See, e.g., Brianna Chesser, Case in Victoria Could Set New Legal Precedent for
Stealthing, RMIT UNIVERSITY (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.rmit.edu.au/news/all-news
/2019/aug/stealthing-legal-precedent [https://perma.cc/RLB3-LZUD] (discussing similar
questions about conceptualization of stealthing in Australian law).
76. See Katie Mettler, Wis. Lawmaker Wants to Outlaw ‘Stealthing’—Nonconsensual
Condom Removal—as Sexual Assault, WASH. POST (May 17, 2017, 5:49 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/05/17/wis-lawmaker-wants-to-out
law-stealthing-nonconsensual-condom-removal-as-sexual-assault [https://perma.cc/PQ
W9-JWW4].
77. Persio, supra note 11.
78. See Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2139–43.
79. See id. at 2103.
80. See id.
81. See Ellen Bublick, Civil Tort Actions Filed by Victims of Sexual Assault: Promise
and Perils, NAT’L ONLINE RESOURCE CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Sept. 2009)
1–3, https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-09/AR_CivilTortActions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TDH3-ZTSY].
82. See Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109, 114 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (finding
that a woman diagnosed with battered woman’s syndrome should be entitled to bring a
tort action against her spouse for injuries sustained throughout their marriage); Alice
Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Practitioner’s Guide to Tort Actions,
10 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 879, 898–900 (1980) (arguing that unwanted physical contact
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elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, fraud,
and especially, battery.83 Courts may take a view that stealthing is
merely a “gap-filler” tort, carving out liability for conduct not cov-
ered by the existing torts, and is thus unnecessary.84 This view has
proven antagonistic to intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims and as a result, application of the tort has been inconsistent
and the burdens of proof are extremely difficult for plaintiffs to
meet.85 Litigants who seek a new cause of action must meaningfully
distinguish the conduct and harm associated with stealthing from
other torts, or otherwise risk dismissal.
In assessing the above preconditions for general recognition of
new causes of action in the context of stealthing—that is, normative
weight, justiciability, adequate case load, and novelty—advocates for
a new tort already face an uphill battle.86 While the time is certainly
ripe for novel causes of action to address sexual misconduct, the
hurdles of justiciability and novelty are significant.87 The conduct and
interests encompassed by the act of stealthing are simultaneously
unique, provoking difficulty in determining the conduct that falls
within its category, and too similar to existing causes of action and
the interests implicated under other torts. It seems unlikely a court
will extend a hand to recognize a new cause of action willingly.88
B. Hurdles Specific to Recognition of Novel Causes of Action
Related to Sexual Misconduct
The preconditions annunciated above are required for recognition
of any new tort; stealthing, however, concerns sexual misconduct
and verbal sexual harassment “constitute a cause of action for assault”); see Larson,
supra note 39, at 402–04.
83. Infra Conclusion.
84. See Russell Fraker, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the Problematic
Tort of IIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983, 1009 (2008). Stealthing implicates elements of both
battery, assault, fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Courts will be unwilling to expand liability to cover conduct that they believe
is implicated in other torts. See Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2143. The pervasive
notion of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a gap-filler tort may similarly be
imposed upon stealthing claims, leading to inconsistent implementation or prohibitive stan-
dards. Fraker, supra note 84, at 1009.
85. See id. at 1026.
86. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 209–10.
87. Abraham & White, supra note 17, at 2143. In their discussion of potential new
torts to address sexual misconduct, Abraham & White discuss the impact of the #MeToo
movement and the current cultural momentum that could lead to the introduction of a
new tort. Id. However, this may not be enough to overcome the evidentiary hurdles to
achieve recognition of a new tort.
88. Brodsky, supra note 1, at 208–09.
2021] TAKING THE LEAD 943
that sets alight the hoops that litigants must jump through in order
to obtain relief. If victims manage to overcome the hurdles associated
with general recognition of new causes of action, they must then com-
bat inescapable gender biases, misconceptions of intangible harm,
and constitutional notions of privacy that specifically permeate sexual
misconduct claims.
1. Gender Biases
Unconscious gender biases and a judiciary that is more than 60%
male has a detrimental impact on female plaintiffs and their ability
to recover damages for harms suffered, particularly when the claim
concerns sexual behavior.89 The reality is that judges are human
and the decisions that they make, regardless of the best of intentions,
are tied to their own identity and experiences.90 When the accumu-
lative identity of the judiciary is confined to the experiences of the
white, male, and Christian, causes of action and claims that impli-
cate conduct outside of their relative experiences will slip through
the cracks.91 Both civil law and criminal law have historically been
unfavorable to women perceived as being sexual, so, in the case of
stealthing, where the victim had originally consented to sex with a
condom, we can expect gender biases to be especially burdensome.92
The basis for this bias seemingly arises from the idea that women
should avoid situations where their “virtue” would be lost and that
it is the victim’s responsibility to protect themselves instead of the
89. See Grace Knobler, Women’s Underrepresentation in the Judiciary, REPRESENT
WOMEN (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.representwomen.org/women_s_underrepresenta
tion_in_the_judiciary [https://perma.cc/4RTE-QEP8]; see also Helen Hershkoff, Some
Questions About #MeToo and Judicial Decision Making, 43 HARBINGER 128, 134–36
(2019), https://socialchangenyu.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Helen-Hershkoff_RLSC
-The-Harbinger_43.2.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP45-M6S4].
90. Kathleen E. Mahoney, The Myth of Judicial Neutrality: The Role of Judicial Edu-
cation in the Fair Administration of Justice, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 785, 793–94 (1996)
(quoting Justice Cardozo: “[T]he predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts
and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man [sic] . . . . The great tides
and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass
judges by.”).
91. Id. at 791.
92. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 39, at 419 (describing Judge Richard Posner’s attempt
to characterize sex obtained by fraud as more a crime of lying than one of invasion of a
woman’s bodily integrity); see also Antonia Elise Miller, Inherent (Gender) Unreasonable-
ness of the Concept of Reasonableness in the Context of Manslaughter Committed in the
Heat of Passion, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 249, 249–50, 254–55 (2010) (discussing
the effect of gender biases in voluntary manslaughter suits and its disparate impact on
women); Leslie Bender, Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78CORNELLL.REV. 575,
585–86 (1993) (discussing the marginalization of women’s injuries in tort law and the
influence of male perspective in tort doctrine).
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perpetrator’s responsibility not to harm.93 Another perverse notion
that often permeates the judiciary’s treatment of women is the idea
of the “lying wom[a]n.”94 The predominantly male judiciary, confined
to their own experiences, struggles to understand the emotions in-
volved for female victims of sexual misconduct, and concludes that
they are lying or exaggerating their claims of assault.95
In tort law, gender biases are repeatedly reflected through the
failure to adequately compensate gender-related injuries, the relega-
tion of causes of action that disparately impact women to family court
or criminal court, or outright dismissal.96 For example, the extreme
emotional consequences of a miscarriage are ignored in favor of
hyper-focusing on the injury and interspousal abuse is treated as a
family issue, precluding vindication in the civil courts.97 Or consider
the reasonable person standard, which has prompted a refusal to
award damages in the case of sexual harassment under the belief
that the conduct is not sufficiently outrageous enough to warrant
liability under intentional infliction of emotional distress.98
The harm suffered by stealthing victims goes beyond cases where
pregnancy or STD transmission occurs. Victims report significant
fears of their occurrence, as well as feelings of violation and betrayal
of trust.99 In order to provide redress for all victims of stealthing,
advocates should seek recognition of intangible harm as well as
physical harm. Tort law and the judges handling tort cases have con-
sistently prioritized physical harm over emotional harm, restricting
liability for emotional harms to the most outrageous conduct and
limiting damages for pure emotional distress.100 By emphasizing
physical harm over emotional harm, courts have continued to mar-
ginalize women in the civil court system.101
Of particular relevance to the topic of this Note is a string of
cases from California and the Superior Court of New Jersey regarding
false misrepresentations in sexual relationships and the proposed
tort of sexual fraud.102 In a cross-claim against the mother of his
93. Larson, supra note 39, at 388.
94. Id. at 446–47.
95. See id.
96. Bender, supra note 92, at 585–86.
97. Id. at 578, 585.
98. Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts
Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 55, 57–58 (1989). In a particularly direct instance
of misogynistic thought, the court in Fardell v. Potts held that at law “there was no such
thing as a reasonable woman.” Id. (quoting 41 N.H. 317 (1860)).
99. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 187.
100. Bender, supra note 92, at 585–86.
101. Id. at 578.
102. The following four casing are outlined chronologically below: Stephen K. v. Roni
L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Cal. Ct. App 1980); Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Cal.
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daughter, Stephen K. filed claims of fraud, negligent misrepresenta-
tion, and negligence after she falsely represented that she was
taking birth control.103 The court ruled against him, declining to step
into bedroom and supervise the promises of adults, citing the consti-
tutional right to privacy.104 Three years after this decision, the same
court held in Barbara A. v. John G. that the right to privacy was not
absolute and that the plaintiff properly pleaded a claim for battery
after she suffered an ectopic pregnancy following the defendant’s
claims that he was infertile.105 The divergent opinions hinged on the
physical harm to the plaintiff in Barbara A. compared to the birth
of a healthy child and the perceived benefits of children in Stephen
K.106 Following the rationale of Barbara A., the Second District of
California once more held that the right of privacy was not absolute
and reversed summary judgment of the plaintiff’s claims for dam-
ages after her sexual partner represented that he was free from
venereal disease, but infested her with herpes.107
After this in-court split on the right to privacy, the California
Court of Appeal in the Fourth District heard a case where the plain-
tiff was encouraged to terminate her pregnancy through promises
of the baby’s father that he would impregnate her within the year.108
The court held that the two previous cases were irreconcilable and
followed the ruling in Stephen K. that the practice of birth control was
better left to the individuals.109 The court acknowledged the incon-
sistent ruling and rooted its judgment in the fact that the public
policy considerations made in cases like Kathleen K. v. Robert B. were
absent here.110 Lastly, the Superior Court of New Jersey attempted
to reconcile issues of privacy in sexual misconduct through the aid
of the aforementioned California courts’ decisions.111 In a matter of
first impression, the court held that public policy concerns precluded
a mother from recovering damages arising out of the false represen-
tation by the defendant that he had had a vasectomy.112 The court
based its determination on the fact that public policy did not sup-
port a claim for the wrongful birth of a child, and that it precluded
Ct. App. 1983); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Perry
v. Atkinson, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 557 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
103. Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
104. Id. at 620.
105. Barbara A., 193 Cal. Rptr. at 426, 430.
106. Compare id. at 430, with Stephen K., 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
107. Kathleen K., 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274, 276.
108. Perry v. Atkinson, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
109. Id. at 406.
110. Id.
111. See C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 559–60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
112. Id. at 561.
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inquiry by the courts into any representations “made before or
during that relationship.”113
The rationale of the courts in the above cases exemplify the
hyper-focus and deference courts place on injury in sexual miscon-
duct claims. Liability was limited to particular classifications of
physical injury, such as an ectopic pregnancy or the contraction of
herpes, while the birth of a healthy child and the termination of preg-
nancy were considered outside judicial scope.114 This limitation re-
flects the judiciary’s inability to understand the emotional and
economic harm that arises from raising and giving birth to a child
you did not want, and the emotional consequences of terminating a
child you did want.115 It also fails to account for the harm that
results from the violation itself; that is, the subsequent fear of harm
and mistrust that arises from deceptive sexual practices.116
Stealthing victims, if confident enough in their resolve to bring
a claim against the perpetrator, will face intense scrutiny over their
behavior by a judiciary who does not understand or does not want
to understand the nature of what has happened to them.117 The
stereotype and misogynistic bias that the sexual woman who con-
sents to sex with a condom gets what she deserves will invade the
merits of the plaintiff’s case.118 Additionally, the he-said-she-said
reality of evidence in the typical stealthing case will predispose
biased judges into the belief that the victim is lying about what hap-
pened behind closed doors.119 Even if the plaintiff is able to overcome
the biases against them, they will then be forced to overcome an-
other bias against intangible harm.120 An advocate for stealthing
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 103–13 and accompanying text.
115. But see Paula C. Murray & Brenda J. Winslett, The Constitutional Right to Privacy
and Emerging Tort Liability for Deceit in Interpersonal Relationships, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REV. 779, 829 (1986) (“[W]here the mother survives without casualty there is still some
loss. She must spread her society, comfort, care, protection and support over a larger
[family] group. If this change in the family status can be measured economically it
should be as compensable as [physical injury].”).
116. See Rape Trauma Syndrome, KING COUNTY SEXUAL ASSAULT RESOURCE CENTER,
https://www.kcsarc.org/sites/default/files/Resources%20-%20Rape%20Trauma%20Syn
drome.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7NV-LAHC].
117. See Eileen Skinnider, Handbook for the Judiciary on Effective Criminal Justice
Responses to Gender-based Violence Against Women and Girls, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS
AND CRIME (2019), https://www.unodc.org/documents/mexicoandcentralamerica/2020
/PrevencionDelito/HB_for_the_Judiciary_on_Effective_Criminal_Justice_Women_and
_Girls_E_ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GAH-AFZT].
118. See Larson, supra note 39, at 429.
119. Id. at 451.
120. See Rape and Sexual Violence: Human Rights Law and Standards in the Inter-
national Criminal Court, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 1, 2011), https://www.amnesty.org/down
load/Documents/32000/ior530012011en.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4C9-R8NN].
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victims will have to adequately argue to the court the emotional dif-
ference and significance of removing the condom as opposed to the
sex they consented to, an argument made more difficult when the
judiciary is unlikely to even have the potential to experience—much
less, have actually experienced—nonconsensual condom removal.121
2. Constitutional Right to Privacy
Just as gender biases continue to prevent recovery to victims of
sexual misconduct, constitutional notions of privacy and a reluc-
tance of the judiciary to step into the confines of the bedroom has
foreclosed recognition of sexual misconduct under new causes of
action.122 In an effort to prevent the continued intrusion of ideologi-
cal forces and governmental control into the sexual lives of Ameri-
can citizens, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the right
of privacy, particularly with regard to sexual intimacy.123 The Court
established that regulation of sexual conduct goes beyond control-
ling behavior; it touches upon the most private human conduct and
the government should refrain from institutionalizing boundaries
absent an injury to another person.124 As a result of the strong
conviction of the Supreme Court that sexual intimacy and its conse-
quences should remain free from governmental interference, the
right to contraception, the right to abortion, and the right to marry
for homosexual men and women, are now established in binding
precedent and in the lives of American citizens.125
121. See Konrad Czechowski, Erin Leigh Courtice, Jonathan Samosh, Jared Davies
& Krystelle Shaughnessy, “That’s Not What Was Originally Agreed To”: Perceptions,
Outcomes and the Legal Contextualization of Non-consensual Condom Removal in a
Canadian Sample, 14 PLOSONE 2–3 (July 10, 2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc
/articles/PMC6619686 [https://perma.cc/Z26C-UN9W].
122. See Murray & Winslett, supra note 115, at 789–92, 798.
123. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)
(noting that the Court had historically recognized a right to personal privacy in the context
of marriage, procreation, and contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454, 461
(1972) (arguing that the decision of whether and when to have a child is a matter beyond
the scope of governmental interference); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–86, 499
(1965) (holding that the intimacies of a marriage are not to be regulated by the State).
124. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
125. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman’s right to an abor-
tion is guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment and the fundamental right to privacy);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 483–86 (holding that a law prohibiting married
couples from using contraception was an unconstitutional violation of the right of privacy);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (holding that the right of choice regard-
ing marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy). These cases represent
landmark decisions that resulted in widespread social change. The right to an abortion
resulted in significant gains for women and Obergefell v. Hodges gave homosexual men
and women across the country the right to marry. The early jurisprudence surrounding
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Judicial deference to the right of privacy in matters of sexual
conduct was intended as a shield against unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusion;126 however, this rigid contemplation of sexual privacy
acts as a sword against novel causes of action arising out of the very
right the Court was seeking to protect: personal autonomy. Courts
are reluctant to recognize new forms of sexual violations at the
unfortunate expense of the victim, citing the fundamental right of
privacy as preventing judicial interference into the behavior.127 As
a result, deceit, manipulation and harassment have either gone un-
redressed by the courts or worse, treated as a necessary element to
human interaction.128
While the right of privacy and its construction in the Supreme
Court has led to significant social development in hot-topic issues like
abortion and gay marriage, the unfortunate byproduct is that asser-
tions of the right of privacy provide a basis for dismissal despite the
merits in sexual misconduct causes of action.129 Although Lawrence v.
Texas held that the right to privacy is not immune to intrusion when
there is an injury to another person, the nature of what the court
deems an injury often determines whether the right to privacy ap-
plies or not, precluding liability when the court decides that the
injury is not sufficient.130 Consider again Stephen K., where the court
dismissed a claim against a woman who lied about using birth con-
trol and held that for courts to “supervise the promises made be-
tween two consenting adults as to the circumstances of their private
sexual conduct . . . would encourage unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters affecting the individual’s right to privacy.”131 The
above California and New Jersey cases illustrate that the right of
privacy stands ready at the helm for defendants of sexual misconduct
the right to privacy exemplifies the noble weaponization of the due process clause against
unwarranted governmental intrusion and as a valuable method of social change.
126. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
127. See Conley v. Romeri, 806 N.E.2d 933, 936–37 (2004) (quoting Stephen K. v. Roni
L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)). In its decision not to recognize a claim of
sexual fraud brought by a plaintiff against her sexual partner who falsely represented that
he could not have children: “[I]t is nothing more than asking the court to supervise the
promises made between two consenting adults as to the circumstances of their private
sexual conduct” (emphasis added). Id. at 937; see also Larson, supra note 39, at 404–05.
128. See Larson, supra note 39, at 443.
129. Compare Larson, supra note 39, at 447–48 (describing the concept of the “lying
woman,” which often affects the judiciary’s treatment of women), with Finley, supra note
98, at 58 (describing the impact that the reasonable person standard has had on the re-
warding of damages, or lack thereof, to female plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases),
and supra notes 103–13 and accompanying text (a string of cases from California and New
Jersey regarding false misrepresentations in sexual relationships and sexual fraud).
130. See Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
131. Id. at 620.
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allegations and that courts will recognize it at the expense of victims
who have suffered violations of their personal autonomy, because
the injury is not one they recognize or deem important.132
The existing precedent related to sexual fraud make clear that
any biases against stealthing claimants can be masqueraded as
recognition of the constitutional right to privacy.133 Courts can ratio-
nalize their reluctance to recognize the harm suffered by victims of
stealthing not as avoiding providing victims recovery for violations
they do not understand or claimants they do not approve of, but rather
as just a continued recognition that courts should stay out of the bed-
room. The weaponization of the constitutional right to privacy to avoid
addressing sexual misconduct continues the victimization of women
and allows the judiciary to sidestep the critical area of governance
they have been tasked with: imposing liability for misconduct.134
II. THE TORT OF BATTERY PROVIDES THE BEST
FRAMEWORK FOR PLAINTIFFS
If able to overcome their own doubts about the viability of their
claims, victims of nonconsensual condom removal will face an uphill
battle in achieving judicial recognition. While notions of true reform,
equality, and justice inspire advocates to pursue a new tort to address
stealthing, this is not the best route for victims.135 The systemic
biases evident in tort law and the court system require advocates to
plan their approach strategically and pursuing a novel cause of action
predisposes a claim to dismissal. The best approach for advocates
and victims is to contextualize the conduct of stealthing within a
framework that is accessible to the judiciary.136 In order to avoid
implicating the right of privacy, the focus should be less on the de-
ception and the promises between the parties, and more on the change
in physical conduct. Additionally, assuming the victim has not suf-
fered any lasting physical harm, plaintiffs should pursue a legal
remedy that provides damages for emotional harm. The use of binding
precedent will force biased judges to recognize stealthing violations
and limit their discretion in denying recovery. For these reasons,
the best choice is an existing tort.
132. See Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620–21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
133. See, e.g., id. at 621.
134. See Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 2: Ethics and Judicial Conduct, Ch.2, UNITED
STATESCOURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united
_states_judges_effective_march_12_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BC3-BTXR].
135. But see Brodsky, supra note 1, at 209–10.
136. Id. at 208–09.
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Stealthing implicates conduct addressed through a variety of
torts and areas of the law. Arguments could be advanced under
theories of fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and bat-
tery.137 Ultimately, the goal of stealthing advocates should be to iden-
tify a cause of action that provides recovery for both the physical and
emotional harm associated, does not impose unduly difficult stan-
dards, and adequately compensates the injury suffered. In weighing
which cause of action will provide the best remedy for plaintiffs, we
should consider: (1) who does the cause of action provide a remedy
for; (2) what conduct will be held liable; and (3) what level of dam-
ages could a plaintiff receive?
A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
The tort of fraudulent misrepresentation holds a defendant liable
for physical harm if they make a false misrepresentation of fact,
opinion, or intention in order to induce another to act in reliance upon
it and the plaintiff “justifiably relies.”138 The elements of the tort and
the comments reflected in the Restatement would support a cause
of action for stealthing under fraudulent misrepresentation; however,
liability for fraudulent misrepresentation is expressly limited to
physical harm.139 This would fail to provide a remedy for any emo-
tional harm suffered by the majority of plaintiffs.
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 provides a mechanism
for recovery of pure emotional harm.140 The plaintiff must prove that
the defendant engaged in “extreme and outrageous conduct” that
“intentionally or recklessly cause[d] severe emotional distress,” and
for bodily harm, if such harm results from it.141 In the context of
stealthing, these requirements may prove preclusive to claims. The
experiences of the male judiciary will inhibit an understanding of
the conduct—the removal of a condom—as extreme or outrageous
conduct.142 Judges may have trouble believing that a reasonable
137. Brodsky, supra note 1, at 199–201.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 557A (1965).
139. Id.
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
141. Id.
142. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 200–01 (noting that not all judges or jury members
are likely to recognize the degree of violation that stealthing involves); Finley, supra note
98, at 55 (discussing the impact of the male perspective in assessing the reasonable
person in the context of sexual harassment cases). We can expect the impact of male bias
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person would find the difference between sex with a condom and sex
without a condom to be so extreme or outrageous as to go beyond the
bounds of human decency.143 This could result in liability only being
imposed in the case of a defendant who knowingly has an STD or is
intentionally attempting to get the plaintiff pregnant, significantly
limiting the amount of plaintiffs able to recover. Further, the ele-
ments of intentional infliction of emotional distress require that the
distress suffered by the victim be severe.144 Again, a lack of judicial
understanding of the feelings of violation associated with the re-
moval of the condom will be prohibitive in assessing the severity of
the plaintiff’s emotional distress.145
The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not
sufficiently cover cases likely to be brought by stealthing victims. The
rigid requirements of the tort provide legal backing for judicial dis-
missal by judges influenced by their own experiences and biases
toward the conduct.146 Further, as argued below, when another tort
more adequately addresses the injury suffered, courts will not impose
liability under the “gap-filler” tort of IIED.147 Under IIED, only the
most severe and outrageous cases of stealthing will make it past the
pleading stage.
to be especially prevalent in the case of stealthing because due to the relatively unknown
nature of it, men and judges have not had the opportunity to even observe the conduct
happening to anyone in their lives. See Marwa Ahmad, Benjamin Becerra, Dyanna
Hernandez, Paulchris Okpala, Amber Olney & Monideepa Becerra, “You Do It without
Their Knowledge”: Assessing Knowledge and Perception of Stealthing among College
Students, 17 INT’L J. ENVIRON. RES. PUBLIC HEALTH 1, 2 (May 18, 2020), https://www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7277099/pdf/ijerph-17-03527.pdf [https://perma.cc
/EJ7C-MN46].
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. d (1965); Brodsky, supra note 1, at
200–01.
144. See McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1045–46 (Me. 1998) (holding that
only the knowing transmission of an STD supported a cause of action for negligent trans-
mission of a sexually transmitted disease); see also Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, https://www.workplacefairness.org/harassment-inten
tional-infliction [https://perma.cc/5AFN-X7TT].
145. See Bender, supra note 92, at 577–78. Bender highlights the impact of the male
perspective on judicial understanding of fright-induced harms, particularly injuries that
are female-centric, such as a miscarriage. Id. at 578.
146. See Fraker, supra note 84, at 993–95. The requirements of severity and extreme
or outrageous conduct are not clearly defined or delineated, allowing the judiciary broad
discretion in its application to the facts of each case. Id. at 994–95. This discretion will
allow a biased judge to ignore valid claims due to his preconceived ideas of what is or is
not outrageous. For stealthing claimants, a cause of action with specific parameters that
limits the judge’s discretion is preferable.
147. Id. at 1009; see Sara Ruliffson, R.I.P. I.I.E.D.: The Supreme Court of Texas Severely
Limits the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 587,
594–96 (2006) (discussing the Texas Supreme Court’s reversal of an award under inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress and explaining that “[the tort] does not operate
where the other torts address the wrong committed.”).
952 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. [Vol. 27:931
C. Battery
At its core, the act of stealthing is the intentional removal of a
condom absent the consent or knowledge of their sexual partner.148
The tort of battery recognizes the individual right to be free from
unwanted physical contact and intrusion of bodily autonomy.149
According to the Restatement
an actor is subject to liability to another for battery if:
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with
the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent appre-
hension of such a contact, and
a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indi-
rectly results.150
The elements and pre-existing case law of battery make it the most
applicable cause of action for stealthing victims as it covers all poten-
tial scenarios of stealthing conduct, whether lasting physical harm
results or not, and does not impose liability inequitably against un-
intentional conduct.151
1. Intent
Whereas some stealthing perpetrators may intend to cause bodily
harm through the intentional transmission of an STD,152 the major-
ity of stealthing defendants, while not intending to cause physical
harm, still act in disregard of the plaintiff’s interest in bodily auton-
omy.153 The requisite intent required for battery is not the intent to
cause bodily harm or offense; all that is required is that the defen-
dant intend the unpermitted contact.154 The intent requirement of
148. See R. KEITH PERKINS, Domestic Tort Actions Against First Party Offenders, in
DOMESTIC TORTS: CIVIL ACTIONS ARISING FROM CRIMINAL CONDUCT WITHIN FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS § 4:6 (2018).
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
150. Id.
151. See id. § 16(1) cmt. a.
152. See Forgan-Smith, supra note 9.
153. See Harris O’Malley, Why We Need to Talk About Stealthing, PAGING DR. NERD-
LOVE (May 1, 2017), https://www.doctornerdlove.com/why-we-need-to-talk-about-stealth
ing [https://perma.cc/RQJ2-L2MC].
154. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 20 (1965). For example, in the classic tort
case of White v. University of Idaho, where a piano teacher intended to lightly touch the
plaintiff on the back, but caused her significant bodily harm, the teacher was found to
be liable to the plaintiff for battery. See 768 P.2d. 827, 828 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989).
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battery aids courts in evaluating stealthing claims in two ways.
First, it imposes liability on the defendant regardless of whether he
intended harm or offense to the plaintiff.155 This allows recovery for
victims of stealthing where the motives of the defendant are not
necessarily malicious, whether it be a desire for ‘increased pleasure’
or a belief that it is their ‘male right,’ but still constitute a conscious
disregard for their bodily autonomy.156 Second, it also prevents lia-
bility from being imposed against defendants who lack an intent to
cause the contact.157 A simple negligence action could impose liabil-
ity against defendants who do not intend to remove the condom but
it breaks or slips off, resulting in transmission of an STD or preg-
nancy.158 This would be perverse to traditional notions of justice,
potentially leading to the over-policing of sexual interactions and
less condom use overall.159 Thus, the intent requirement extends
liability to antisocial behavior absent harm or immediate offense, but
also declines to intrude too far into the sexual relationships between
men and women and impose liability for purely negligent conduct.
2. Harmful or Offensive Contact
The elements of battery also provide a remedy beyond individu-
als who have suffered harmful contact by expanding liability to
cover all offensive contact.160 Rooted in the rationale that the law is
meant to prevent self-help and retaliation, the law recognizes the
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16(1), cmt. a (1965).
156. See O’Malley, supra note 153.
157. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) cmt. e, illus. 5 (1979), with
McPherson, 712 A.2d at 1046–47. While the court will hold a defendant liable for battery
after transmission of an STD when they knew or should have known that they were a
carrier, it refuses to impose liability when they are ignorant of the fact that they are
infected. See McPherson, 712 A.2d at 1046. In the stealthing context, this rationale
would prevent liability from being imposed on a defendant who did not realize the condom
had broken or slipped off.
158. But see McPherson, 712 A.2d at 1046 (refusing to impose liability for battery in
the case of an unknowing transmission of HPV or hold the defendant liable for negligent
transmission of a sexually transmitted disease in the absence of the defendant’s knowl-
edge of his infection).
159. See Higgins et al., supra note 10 and accompanying text. If liability were to be
imposed against defendants who suffer from a condom break or other defect, absent any
intent on their part or any risk of STD transmission, the courts would be intruding into
the consensual sexual interactions between men and women. Further, the risk of liability
could have the adverse consequence of men refusing to wear condoms entirely out of fear
that they could be sued. In light of the relative lack of power of women to negotiate
condom use, the result of this could actually exacerbate the problem.
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 (1965).
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reprehensibility of intentionally causing offensive contact.161 Liabil-
ity is imposed regardless of whether the plaintiff was aware of the
offensive contact at the time, emphasizing the importance of the dig-
nitary interest involved.162 According to the Restatement, a “contact
is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.”163 If
the contact violates current social notions in the manner in which it
is conducted, it qualifies as offensive contact.164
Stealthing plaintiffs can frame their arguments about the of-
fense in two ways: as a general violation of personal dignity or as a
violation of their consent. Under the first argument, stealthing is
offensive because each individual has the right to freedom from un-
wanted intentional contact.165 In the context of sexual conduct, the
intrusion on personal dignity is exacerbated as intercourse places us
at our most vulnerable; the violation of trust involved in stealthing
creates a prima facie case of offensive contact.166
Under a consent argument, advocates should use traditional
notions of consent by arguing that any violation of a plaintiff’s will is
offensive contact. It is per se offensive to violate the conditions es-
tablished by the victim.167 In Richmond v. Fisk, the defendant made
contact with the plaintiff when he shook him awake despite being
forbidden from entering the room and was held liable for trespass to
person (battery).168 In the same sense that waking up a person against
their express wishes is offensive, the act of removing a condom against
a sexual partner who conditions consent upon its use is offensive.169
3. Consent
The primary issue facing stealthing plaintiffs and their ad-
vocates is the defense of consent and whether or not the act of
161. See Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 554 (Ill. 1872) (noting that, to maintain societal
cohesion, the law should step in when a person has experienced an offensive contact that
could provoke a retaliative act).
162. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1965).
163. See id. § 19.
164. See id. § 19 cmt. a.
165. See id. § 18 cmt. g.
166. See Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and
Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1626–27 (2012).
167. See, e.g., Richmond v. Fisk, 160 N.E. 103, 103 (Mass. 1893).
168. See id.
169. Compare id. (explaining the offensiveness of waking a person against express
wishes), with Ashley Mateo, ‘Stealthing’ Is a Dangerous Type of Sexual Abuse—Here’s
What You Need to Know About It, HEALTH (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.health.com/condi
tion/sexual-assault/what-is-stealthing [https://perma.cc/PL3V-ZY8L] (describing the of-
fensiveness of removing a condom without consent).
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removing the condom “vitiates” consent to sex generally.170 The basis
of defendants’ arguments will focus on the initial consent to sexual
intercourse and argue that the plaintiff’s consent to sex generally
precludes recovery.171 Whether or not the act of removing the condom
vitiates consent is the primary hurdle that plaintiffs must overcome
when bringing a stealthing claim under battery and the existing
jurisprudence of battery provides the precedent necessary to suffi-
ciently argue that consent was not present.172
As the sole adjudication of a stealthing claim on record, Assange
v. Swedish Prosecution Authority stands as the prime example of
what litigants can expect a stealthing trial to look like in terms of
the arguments made and the opinion adopted by the court.173 In
Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Authority, Wikileaks founder Julian
Assange had sexual relations with a woman referred to as AA.174
During this encounter, Assange purposefully broke the condom, de-
spite her making it clear that protection was required, and ejacu-
lated inside her.175 The High Court of the United Kingdom focused
on the fact that Assange knew that her consent was conditioned on
the use of a condom and willfully disregarded this when he broke it
without her knowledge.176 Assange argued that AA’s consent to the
act of sexual intercourse in general precluded liability because there
is no liability when the contact is consensual.177 The court decided
this argument was without merit and used a conditional consent
standard to formulate their judgment.178 They ultimately held that
consent to sexual intercourse with a condom is not the same as con-
sent to sexual intercourse without the condom, and the removal of
it amounted to rape.179
While this case is both outside the United States’ jurisdiction and
is a criminal case, the arguments made by the defense and adopted
170. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 190.
171. See, e.g., Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Auth. [2011] EWHC (QB) 2849 (Eng.)
at [126], available at http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/High-Court-2
-Novembre-2011-assange-approved-judgment-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3FX-B2QG] (stating
the defense’s argument that the defendant had a reasonable belief in consent because
the accusing party had agreed to have sex with him at the outset).
172. See Brodsky, supra note 1, at 190–92.
173. Assange, EWHC (QB) 2849 at [84] (offering an example of arguments as to consent
put forth by the defense); see also id. at [95–96] (finding that the removal of a condom when
sexual intercourse was conditioned on the use of a condom was a crime).
174. Id. at [1].
175. Id. at [93].
176. Id. at [95].
177. Id. at [79].
178. Assange, EWHC (QB) 2849 at [86].
179. Id. at [116].
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by the court illustrate the same arguments likely to be used in
United States litigation. In Assange, the United Kingdom court fo-
cused on the concept of conditional consent and its requirement that
consent is predicated on the conditions agreed upon being maintained
throughout.180 The concept of conditional consent adopted by the
United Kingdom court finds its United States’ sister in the consent
requirements present in medical battery jurisprudence.181 Stealth-
ing plaintiffs will be able to utilize the relevant medical battery
jurisprudence under the concepts of scope of consent, substantial
mistake, and conditional consent.182
A doctor commits a medical battery when they violate the pa-
tient’s consent in three scenarios: (1) when the doctor has received
consent for one procedure, but subsequently performs a substan-
tially different procedure; (2) the patient has consented to the proce-
dure but has made a substantial mistake as to the interest invaded
or the extent of the harm; and (3) when the patient expressly placed
conditions upon the operation and the doctor acts outside the scope
of those conditions.183
Under the first theory, the plaintiff must show that the proce-
dure actually performed constitutes a substantial change to the
consented procedure.184 In Conte v. Girard Orthopaedic Surgeons
Medical Group, Inc., the plaintiff-patient had consented to a proce-
dure that he believed would result in the repair of his shoulder.185
However, during the procedure, the defendant-doctor decided not to
proceed with the repair because of concerns that it would make the
injury worse.186 The plaintiff predicated his argument on the fact
that the surgery he received, one that would not repair his shoulder,
was a substantially different surgery than the one he consented to,
one that would repair his shoulder.187 The court was not persuaded,
reasoning that the doctor had acted within the scope of consent
because the doctor performed less than he was authorized to do.188
There is no consent to a medical procedure if the basis for the
patient’s consent is a substantial mistake concerning the nature of
180. Id. at [86].
181. Compare id. at [102], with discussion infra note 184 and accompanying text.
182. See infra notes 184–85, 200, 205, and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Conte v. Girard Orthopaedic Surgeons Med. Grp., Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr.
2d 855, 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435,
440 (Ariz. 2003); Piedra v. Dugan, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
184. See, e.g., Conte, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859–60.
185. See id. at 857.
186. See id. at 858.
187. See id. at 860.
188. See id.
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the operation and the risks involved, induced by the misrepresenta-
tion of the doctor.189 In Duncan v. Scottsdale Imaging, Ltd., the plain-
tiff was set to undergo sedation and told the nurse that she would
only accept Demerol or morphine, and no other drug, an instruction
which the nurse assured her would be followed.190 The patient re-
peatedly refused the use of fentanyl and only consented to the pro-
cedure when the nurse promised that morphine would be used.191
Despite this, the nurse administered fentanyl to the patient, leading
to serious complications.192 Although the court discussed both lack
of informed consent (which sounds in negligence) and conditional
consent, the court ultimately held that the patient’s consent was
obtained by misrepresentation and constituted a substantial mistake,
vitiating consent.193
If the patient is advancing an argument that they placed condi-
tions or restrictions on their consent, known as a conditional con-
sent theory, they must prove that: (1) “[the] consent was conditional;
[(2)] the doctor intentionally violated the condition while providing
treatment; and [(3)] the patient suffered harm as a result of the
doctor’s violation of the condition.”194 When a sixteen-year-old scoliosis
patient required surgery to correct her spine, she conditioned her
consent to the use of only family donated blood in the operation.195
The surgeon acted in violation of this express condition by giving
her nonfamily donated blood, resulting in the contraction of HIV.196
The court ultimately did not hold Dr. King liable; however, it was
not on the basis of lack of conditional consent but rather the fact
that Dr. King was unaware of the condition.197 Stealthing claimants
can argue that the act of removing the condom vitiated their consent
to sexual intercourse through the utilization of any of the three theo-
ries discussed above. The viability of each is dependent on the facts
of the particular case.198
Under the scope-of-consent theory, plaintiffs should argue that
sex without a condom exceeds the scope of what was consented to.199
Unprotected sex goes significantly beyond the scope of protected sex,
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (AM. L. INST. 1979).
190. See Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 437 (Ariz. 2003).
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 441.
194. See Piedra v. Dugan, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
195. See Ashcraft v. King, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900, 901 (Cal Ct. App. 1991).
196. See id. at 902.
197. See id.
198. See supra notes 185–99 and accompanying text.
199. See Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 440 (Ariz. 2003) (“[A]ny-
thing greater or different than . . . [what was] consented to becomes a battery.”).
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placing the plaintiff at an increased risk of infection and preg-
nancy.200 In the case of stealthing, by removing the condom the
defendant has intentionally deviated from the consent given and
performed a substantially different act than protected sex.201 Defen-
dants will argue that sex with a condom is not substantially different
than sex without, pointing to the low use of condoms in the general
population.202 However, the increased risk intimacy associated with
unprotected sex makes this argument akin to arguing that consent
to a hand-to-hand fight is consent to a fight with brass knuckles.203
Under a substantial mistake theory, stealthing plaintiffs will
argue that they never would have consented to sexual intercourse
in the first place if not for the defendant’s misrepresentation that a
condom will be worn.204 The plaintiff clearly made a substantial
mistake concerning the nature of the invasion to her interests and
the harm expected; she believed she was having protected sex when,
in fact, she was not. The defendant knew that, and the plaintiff was
acting in reliance on their misrepresentation and would have been
properly apprised of the risks but for the defendant’s conduct.205
Again, defendants may argue that the belief in condom use does not
constitute a ‘substantial mistake’; however, in the context of sexual
intercourse, the difference between sex with a condom and sex with-
out a condom is large.206 While this theory has been most clearly
advanced in the context of medical battery, it directly follows the
language of § 892B and has been enforced in other areas of battery
jurisprudence.207
The most likely argument advanced by defendants will be that
the difference between unprotected and protected sex is so minimal
that it cannot be a substantial mistake and is merely a collateral
200. See Shane Murphy & Cameron White, What Are the Real Risks of Condomless Sex?
What Everyone Should Know, HEALTHLINE (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.healthline.com
/health/hiv/risks-sex-without-condoms#number-of-partners [https://perma.cc/JM83-RAD5].
201. See, e.g., Conte v. Girard Orthopaedic Surgeons Med. Grp., Inc., 132 Cal. Rptr.
2d 855, 859–60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a doctor who obtains consent for one
procedure but subsequently performs another is liable for medical battery).
202. See Steven Reinberg, Only About One-Third of Americans Use Condoms: CDC,
WEBMD (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.webmd.com/sex/news/20170810/only-about-one
-third-of-americans-use-condoms-cdc#1 [https://perma.cc/X9J6-GYHS].
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A illus. 9 (1979).
204. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(4) cmt. h (1979)(noting that receiving
consent does not protect an individual from liability resulting from exceeding that consent).
205. See, e.g., Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 440 (Ariz. 2003).
206. See Reinberg, supra note 202 (discussing the public health benefits of using
condoms).
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1979); see, e.g., Duncan, 70 P.3d
at 440; Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 871, 877 (Idaho, 1994).
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matter to sexual intercourse.208 This argument should not prevail and
available precedent in battery jurisprudence refutes this argument.209
In Neal v. Neal, plaintiff alleged a prima facie case of battery against
her husband when she became aware that he was sexually involved
with another woman.210 She advanced the theory of battery on the
basis that she would not have consented to sex with her husband
had she been aware of the affair, as the contact would have been
offensive.211 The Supreme Court of Idaho ruled that her husband’s
misrepresentation of fidelity potentially induced her into sexual
intercourse, overturning the district court’s verdict that his fidelity
was merely a collateral matter and not a substantial mistake.212
The language of the Restatement and Neal v. Neal provide the
necessary precedents plaintiffs need to prove the element of battery
that the contact be nonconsensual and combat defendants’ primary
argument.213 If the infidelity of a sexual partner constitutes a sub-
stantial mistake concerning the nature of the contact or the harm to
be expected from it, something only indirectly related to the physical
contact itself, nonconsensual condom removal must be considered a
substantial mistake.214 It directly relates to the physical act itself
and constitutes an increased risk of physical harm or offense, creat-
ing a substantial mistake relating to the nature of the invasion of
her interests.215
While the above two theories potentially cover instances of
stealthing where the plaintiff did not expressly require the use of a
condom, the conditional consent doctrine is implicated when the
plaintiff has made an express condition of the use of a condom and
harm results as a result of violating that condition.216 Although the
conditional consent theory requires heightened pleading of an express
208. See, e.g., Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881, 889–90 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
209. Compare id. at 890 (holding that defendant’s representation that he had been
faithful to his wife despite engaging in an extramarital affair was merely a collateral
matter that did not vitiate consent to sex), with id. at 877 (reversing the lower court
opinion and holding that consent predicated on facts known at the time does not destroy
exceptions for consent induced by a fraudulent act).
210. See id. at 876.
211. See Neal, P.2d at 876.
212. See id. at 877.
213. See infra notes 183–89 and accompanying text.
214. But see Athena Katsampes, A Rape By Any Other Name? The Problem of Defining
Acts of Protection Deception and the University as a Solution, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L.
157, 165 (2017) (discussing the drawbacks of codifying deception as a means of negation
of dissent).
215. See Mateo, supra note 169.
216. See Piedra v. Dugan, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (keeping in mind
that, unlike Dr. Dugan, the defendant in a stealthing case intentionally deviates from the
terms of consent).
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condition and harm to the plaintiff, elements absent in the above theo-
ries, this theory would avoid the arguments advanced by the defen-
dant that there is not a substantial difference between unprotected
and protected sex.217 It is immaterial in conditional consent cases
whether or not the change is substantial; there is an individual right
to place conditions on the consent given.218 This theory leaves less dis-
cretion to the judge to rule based on their notions of the violation.219
By utilizing the medical battery, Restatement, and general bat-
tery jurisprudence, plaintiffs will present the conduct of stealthing
through a lens that judges not only understand, but will be bound
to follow.220 The conversation about whether the removal of a con-
dom vitiates the consent to sex will be posed as a general question:
when one person intentionally and without consent changes the
nature of what is being done to the other person, should they be held
liable? The sexual relationship between the parties, and the inherent
biases and constitutional notions of privacy, become just a contextual
factor and the crux of the complaint is centered around personal
autonomy and the ability of the individual to define the terms of
their consent. By utilizing medical battery standards, an area where
doctors are given significant deference by the judiciary, stealthing
victims can use this protection to their advantage.221 If we hold
doctors liable for extending the scope of a patients consent, even in
the high-intensity realm of the medical profession, how could we de-
cline to extend liability to the antisocial conduct of removing con-
traception?222 If a judge were to dismiss the action, they would no
longer be dismissing a novel cause of action—it would be an outright
rejection of precedent and standards established for decades.
217. See id.
218. See Ashcraft v. King, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900, 905 (Cal Ct. App. 1991).
219. Compare Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881, 890 (finding that the defendant’s repre-
sentation of his faithfulness to his wife was a collateral matter that did not rise to a
substantial mistake), with Assange v. Swedish Prosecution Auth. [2011] EWHC (QB) 2849
(Eng.) at [102], available at http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/High
-Court-2-Novembre-2011-assange-approved-judgment-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3FX-B2QG]
(holding that AA had a right to place conditions on the consent given using the conditional
consent theory).
220. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Is ‘stealthing’ sexual assault? New tort should allow
damages, law review article argues, ABA J. (Apr. 27, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://www.aba
journal.com/news/article/new_tort_should_cover_stealthing_law_review_article_says
[https://perma.cc/ZN3Z-5C6K] (describing the current system’s reliance on judges willing-
ness to fit harm into pre-existing legal areas).
221. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. King, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900, 903–04 (Cal Ct. App. 1991) (explain-
ing conditional consent in the context of medical battery).
222. See Kellie Scott, Stealthing in ‘I May Destroy You’ can happen to anyone. Here’s
what you should know, ABC EVERYDAY (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.abc.net.au/every
day/why-stealthing-is-a-violation-of-consent/12639172 [https://perma.cc/C32X-4BUV].
2021] TAKING THE LEAD 961
CONCLUSION
Following the #MeToo movement, the question has become: what
do we do next?223 How do we adapt and change our laws to address
issues that for decades have affected women, but are only now sur-
facing and demanding patient’s attention? Efforts have focused on
effectuating lasting legal reform through the introduction of legislative
policies targeting sexual misconduct.224 These efforts have either been
stalled or outright rejected by a legislature or judiciary restricted by
a conservative, male perspective.225 The stalemate between the desire
for reform and a system that is either slow to change, or outright
antagonistic to it, begs the real question: what can we do now?
So often, it appears that in order to change society, we have to
adapt the law.226 However, the law and existing precedent present a
unique opportunity for advocates to lead the country in the correct
direction without the country realizing that they are being led at all.
In framing stealthing claims under the existing tort of battery,
judges will be directed away from their worst inclinations and biases,
forcing them to recognize the veracity of the claims. They will no
longer be able to avoid facing the reality that women face daily be-
cause, through contextualizing stealthing under battery, the con-
versation becomes one that we could all face: a physical invasion of our
interest in bodily autonomy. A rejection of this interest would be in op-
position to the very foundation of our common law system and a judge
faced with a stealthing case will have to choose between disrupting
the current flow of precedent or allowing the claim to move forward.
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